What drives an individual to choose self-employment over a more traditional wageearning job, or vice-versa? Expected earnings, income variability and other qualitative aspects, such as the levels of independence and job satisfaction, may affect this choice. This type of decision-making is inherently dynamic as choices affect the accumulation of labor experience specific to either sector and, thus, the worker's current and future well-being. This paper models an individual's decision over employment type by estimating a stochastic, discrete choice, dynamic optimization problem using panel data from Chile's Social Security Survey. We simulate employment type choices in the context of the hypothetical scenario of a proposed mandatory universal unemployment insurance scheme under different socioeconomic and experience categories. Consistent with theories of accumulation of specific experience and specialization, we observe a drop in the expected impact of the reform on choices for older and more experienced workers.
Introduction
While self-employment in developed countries is ordinarily associated with highly-educated, risk-taking, wealthy entrepreneurs, in developing economies, it more closely resembles "disguised unemployment" (Mandelman and Montes-Rojas, 2009 ). Bravo, Ruiz-Tagle and Vasquez (2010) , for instance, show that less than 10 percent of self-employed workers in Chile could be considered high-skilled entrepreneurs in 2006. In addition, the great majority of selfemployed workers in developing economies have no access to "social security, severance pay, minimum wage or working condition standards" (Puentes, Contreras and Sanhueza, 2007) . Consequently, a question that arises is what factors individuals in developing countries consider in order to choose self-employment over more standard salaried or waged work arrangements and vice versa.
Differences in compensation between sectors, both in terms of the expected level of remuneration and its variability, may be one factor. Borjas and Bronars (1989) , for instance, finds that the standard deviation of weekly income for self-employed workers is significantly higher, and thus, riskier, than that of wage-earning workers. Consequently, risk preferences may play a relevant role in workers' decisions.
1
In terms of differences in earnings, standard theories of wage determination emphasize the importance of education and experience. These two variables, however, affect the accumulation of human capital over time differently. While formal education becomes a static state variable once finalized, experience is inherently dynamic: one additional year of work cumulates to both the total and sector-specific number of years of experience. Therefore, the choice of employment type is also dynamic, in that decisions can not only affect the individual's current utility, but also the accumulated experience and thus their streams of future earnings. This paper examines the process behind an individual's choice-making between selfemployment and wage-employment. We model and estimate a stochastic, discrete choice, dynamic optimization problem using panel data from Chile's Social Security Survey.
2 Uncertainty is introduced into the model in two ways: (1) workers face a known probability of becoming unemployed every period; and (2) the stream of income from either option is unknown, though the probability distributions are common knowledge.
Estimation results suggest that (1) workers are on average risk averse; thus, all else equal, they tend to prefer less risky wage-earning jobs; (2) after controlling for education and experience, the residual earnings gap between the two sectors does not significantly affect workers' decisions; (3) education affects average earnings for both wage earners and self-employed workers, but its marginal effect does not significantly vary between sectors; (4) data confirm the dynamic nature of this type of decision-making as the accumulation of experience significantly affects earnings in each sector, and (5) experience as self-employed has a larger impact on earnings than experience as wage earner.
A benefit of using a structural approach is that it allows us to model the actual processes that lead to changes in individual behavior and then simulate employment type choice under alternative socioeconomic scenarios or as a consequence of major policy changes. In Chile, as in many countries, there is unemployment insurance that supplements workers income in case of job loss, where both the insurance cost (premium) and benefits are a function of the individual's income. This system, however, is currently compulsory only in the wageearning sector. A proposed legislation change would require self-employed workers to also buy unemployment insurance. Therefore, we simulate individuals' responses when self-employed workers have the same unemployment insurance as those currently required by law to wage earners. The purpose of this policy simulation exercise is to empirically test whether the hypothetical resulting lower income variability from such legislation could be valued by potential self-employed workers and so affect their decisions. In addition, we examine how differences in education and experience affect the choice of employment type under the alternative policy scenarios.
Simulation results tend to indicate that a mandatory unemployment insurance scheme would increase the overall number of workers choosing self-employment by about 3 percent, suggesting that self-employed individuals, while still having the option of self-insuring, indeed value having access to a formal unemployment insurance scheme. Except for the group with the lowest number of years of schooling, the aforementioned trend is observed for all categories of education, experience and age. We also observe a stronger impact of the reform on choices for younger and less experienced workers.
These results are consistent with a number of relevant theories that relate productivity and compensation. The notion that job compensation in relation to other alternatives increases as the length of the job rises has been explored by several economists (see Becker (1964) , Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) and Topel (1991) , among many others). The common factor in all of them is that as workers add experience and seniority over time, they accumulate specific skills that are not necessarily transferable. As Topel (1991) puts it, "a major component of earning capacity is both unique to a particular employment relationship and increasing in importance as the relationship ages." The author finds evidence of a significant relationship between wages and seniority by observing wage changes of workers that had to change jobs. Though mobility in these articles is more closely related to inter job changes, one may think that the impact of accumulating job-specific capital in lowering the mobility from wage-earning to self-employed jobs should be even stronger.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 includes a brief literature review on self-employment. Section 3 introduces the data set used in this paper and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the theoretical model and its solution method. Section 5 provides empirical results and presents tests of goodness of fit. Section 6 describes and analyzes the results of a simulation exercise. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Many studies examine self-employment as a risky but potentially lucrative entrepreneurial activity. In fact, individuals in developed countries who get involved in such activities are typically assumed to be highly educated, to hold above-average levels of wealth (for instance, for starting up capital), and to present below-average levels of risk aversion. The right combination of skills and preferences may allow self-employed individuals to be successful entrepreneurs.
However, self-employment can also be undertaken by formerly wage-earning individuals who have unexpectedly become unemployed. Hyytinen and Rouvinen (2008) argue that in European countries selection into self-employment is mostly involuntary. Moreover, the authors claim that brief self-employment periods found for highly educated men correspond to simply covered unemployment: the "disguised unemployment hypothesis." Audretsch, Thurik, van Stel and Carree (2006) find that for OECD countries there are two types of self-employment: those who are "real" entrepreneurs and those who are "refugees" from unemployment. The authors find that the former prevail in these economies.
The definition of self-employment is even more complex for developing economies. Desai (2009) argues that there are three dimensions relevant for defining an economic activity as self-employment: work formality, legal status and whether self-employment is a consequence of necessity or opportunity. Necessity would be more related to unemployment, while opportunity is more closely linked to entrepreneurship in its more traditional view.
Empirical support of self-employment in developing economies is somewhat mixed. Mandelman and Montes-Rojas (2009) find strong evidence of a segmented (or dual) self-employed sector in Argentina. The authors suggest the coexistence of both disguised unemployment and traditional entrepreneurial activities. Their results indicate that disguised unemployment represents the largest share of self-employment. Bravo et al. (2010) argue that less than 10 percent of self-employed workers in Chile could be considered high-skilled, again not supporting the idea that most self-employment could be understood as traditional entrepreneurs. However, Puentes et al. (2007) find that the level of self-employment does not significantly respond to business cycle fluctuations in Chile. This result goes against the hypothesis of disguised unemployment. Consequently, the question about what drives the decision of becoming self-employed (or staying as self-employed) is rather complex. Wage differentials, earnings uncertainty and preferences are among the most studied aspects by economists. Robinson and Sexton (1994) , for instance, analyze the impact of both education and experience on the business success of an entrepreneur using U.S. census data. They examine the common belief that, unlike experience, education is not an important variable that explains the probability of becoming an entrepreneur or the chances of entrepreneurship success. Contrary to the said belief, the authors find that self-employed workers have more years of schooling than wage employees and that more years of schooling increases the probability of becoming self-employed. In addition, their findings also include that education affects significantly earnings for both wage earners and self-employed, though the impact is not significantly different between types of employment. Similar but weaker results are found for experience.
Besides risk aversion, job satisfaction elements such as non-pecuniary benefits are important components within preferences. Dawson, Henley and Latreille (2009) , using data from the U.K., find substantial heterogeneity for the reported reasons for someone to be self-employed. The authors claim that necessity, opportunity, lifestyle decisions and occupational choices are also important considerations. Their results indicate that females are more concerned about lifestyle while males are more focused on earnings. Moreover, they find that self-employment is usually associated with more highly educated individuals because they tend to see self-employment as an opportunity. However, they also find that higher levels of education do not have a significant impact on decisions about self-employment when individuals join family businesses. For the case of Chile, Bravo et al. (2010) show that consumption and saving preferences, retirement saving patterns, time preferences and risk aversion all play an important role in the decision to become a self-employed worker.
A number of economists have placed significant attention on job satisfaction. Benz and Frey (2008) claim that self-employment leads to higher job satisfaction for all categories of income and hours worked in European economies. Their results link satisfaction with higher autonomy and more rewarding work content. Hamilton (2000) concludes that nonpecuniary benefits must be a substantial consideration for the self-employed in the U.S., as only these benefits can explain residual earning differentials between sectors of 35 percent. On the other hand, Hanglberger and Merz (2011) conclude that job satisfaction for self-employment is overestimated. The authors claim that adaptation and anticipation effects counteract most of the job satisfaction effect.
Preferences for self-employment may also be related to genetics. Nicolaou et al. (2008) obtains a heritability of 0.41 for self-employment after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. This result is consistent with family businesses and evidence found by Verheul, Thurik and Grilo (2008) in European countries, who find that having self-employed parents increases the probability of being self-employed.
While preferences seem relevant in determining self-employment choices, one must keep in mind that choices are not "for the rest of one's life." Although Bravo et al. (2010) and Cea, Contreras, Martinez and Puentes (2008) find evidence of persistence in self-employment decisions, people do transit from one sector to the other. That is, people make decisions about self-employment continuously.
Individuals do differ in terms of the time spans they stay in each state, as they understand the importance of the accumulation of experience, both in terms of the type of employment (self-employment versus wage-earning work) and the occupation or entrepreneurship activity they have chosen. As theory and evidence on human capital have found, higher levels of labor experience are associated with higher levels of earnings that an individual can extract from a particular line of work. In the case of self-employment, human capital tends to be specific in that the accumulated experience in one sector is not easily transferable to the other sector. Individuals usually "learn" how to be self-employed or how to run their particular businesses. This learning process becomes dynamic as the series of current and past decisions are relevant for an individual an any point in time. The dynamic analysis of the experience and self-employment decisions framework is the main contribution of this paper, which to the best of our knowledge, is a topic that has not been extensively covered in empirical economic literature. We believe that the traditional human capital framework can be enriched through a better understanding of self-employment decisions from a dynamic perspective. (Bravo et al., 2008) . The survey requires individuals to report on their employment history and classify their labor statuses as "employed," "unemployed" or "inactive." If employed, the individual is then asked to indicate whether his or her job can be classified as "employer," "self-employed" or "wage earner." In our study, the classification of self-employment consists of the first two categories.
The combined panel includes 14,691 individuals for whom there are observations for at least two years. The survey normally does not accurately distinguish between inactivity and unemployment, as labor status is self-reported. Given that data show that men tend to experience less unemployment and exit the labor force less frequently than women (Niemi, 1974) , we decided to limit our sample to only male observations, which reduces the sample to 7,445 individuals. This adjustment also avoids dealing with sample selection bias that typically arises in females wage studies (Heckman, 1979) , even though it restricts the scope of our results to males only. Second, we limit the sample to those who are in their labor ages (18-65), which further reduces the sample to 6,310 individuals. Finally, we excluded individuals for whom we find anomalies or measurement errors such as people with jobs that reported no income or that present other relevant missing information. This reduces our sample size to 5,460 individuals.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The core of this paper is at the transitions that workers undertake among the different employment statuses and the accumulation of sector-specific experience over time. Table 1 provides a summary of the transition matrix that we extract from the data. [ For the purpose of better understanding the underlying process of employment-type choice, we present in Table 2 some descriptive statistics coming from the transition matrix. For instance, as found by Bravo et al. (2010) , permanent self-employed workers are on average six years older and have at least one year less of formal education than permanent wage earners. The picture is somehow different for switchers. In fact, those who migrated from wage earning jobs to self-employment are slightly older than those who remained as wage earners (by about one year), but are significantly more experienced, particularly experience as self-employed (3.5 years more). This is consistent with the fact that workers typically prefer wage earning jobs at the beginning of their life-cycle and tend to switch to selfemployment as they get older and more experienced (Bravo et al., 2010) . In addition, these figures confirm the fact that self-employed workers in Chile are in general less educated than wage earners.
With respect to the link between earnings and the choice of employment type, data show that average earnings in the self-employed sector were almost 3 percent lower than that for wage earners in 2006 ($7,512 and $7,716 for those who remained as self-employed and wage employed, respectively). This relatively small difference in unconditional earnings could be explained by the aforementioned differences in education and experience between sectors. Nevertheless, earnings growth between 2004 and 2006 favored wage earners, as their income increased by 7.2 percent, compared to a reduction of 3.5 percent for self-employed workers during the same period (see last row in Table 2 ).
With respect to switchers, one may expect that those who transited from one type of job to the other did so as a response of more attractive earnings. In fact, we observe precisely that workers tend to obtain higher earnings when they switch. Namely, those who migrated from wage employment to self-employment increased their income by 4.6 percent between 2004 and 2006, while those who moved in the opposite direction experienced a 15.7 percent increase in their earnings.
In order to examine the role played by specific experience in employment choices, we analyze indices of both employment experience and density. While experience is defined as the number of years a person has been classified as wage earner or self-employed over his or her working life, density corresponds to the proportion of the individual's working life spent in each employment type. For instance, those who remained as wage earners had on average 17.7 years of experience as wage earners and 18.7 years of total experience, which corresponds to wage-employment and self-employment densities of 80.3 percent and 84.3, respectively. However, those who migrated from wage-employment to self-employment present a 39.1 percent self-employed density, indicating that they have transited through selfemployment significantly more in the past, thus acquiring some specific experience. On the other hand, those who remained as self-employed have 16.3 years of experience in that sector, and 23.1 years as of total experience, which corresponds to a total employment density of 76.9 percent. The lower employment density observed for self-employed relative to wage-earners is consistent with the disguised unemployment hypothesis, which implies more unemployment spells. Nevertheless, those who stayed as self-employed have 76.6 percent density in that sector, thus having accumulated significant specific experience. However, those who migrated from self-employment to wage employment have significantly less self-employment density (only 52.7 percent).
Modeling the Choice of Employment Type
Following a standard human capital approach, education and experience play a central role in determining wage differentials among workers. However, as formal schooling normally finishes early in an individual's labor life and becomes a static state variable afterwards, experience continues to be inherently dynamic until the worker retires. In addition, experience specific to self-employment and wage employment also evolves dynamically according to each individual's time path of decisions regarding employment type. Therefore, given the potentially significant role that total and specific experience may play in the path of future labor decisions, a dynamic model where specific experience is a state variable gains relevance. That is, the choice of type of employment not only affects the individual's current utility, but the accumulated sector specific experience may also impact their streams of future earnings in each sector.
In this section we present a dynamic model of employment type choice that incorporates the specificity of human capital accumulation discussed above. We solve the discrete choice dynamic optimization problem recursively and, given its nonlinearity, we estimate the model's unknown parameters using maximum likelihood. Subsequently, we use the estimated model to simulate the impact on the choice of employment type of a policy that would make compulsory for self-employed workers to buy unemployment insurance.
Discrete Choice
The annual discrete choice that each individual makes is which type of job to select ( t ): either to be wage-employed by signing a yearly contract and receiving a known paycheck each month, or to be self-employed and receive an unknown stream of earnings throughout the year. That is, = 0 if wage-employed 1 if self-employed (1)
State Variables
As of the beginning of age t, the main state variables are given by the individual's employment status (E t ) in each period
and the individual's overall work experience (X t ) and experience in each sector (X t ), which evolve over time according to their job status and choice of type of employment in each period:
Utility Function and Budget Constraint
Let C t be a bundle of goods for household consumption at age t. The utility an individual with job choice receives every period is given by the following utility function:
where 1 − α 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Wage earners in Chile are required by law to spend about 3 percent of their earnings on unemployment insurance, among other mandatory social protection expenses. In addition, we assume for simplicity that individuals do not incur in spending beyond consumption and the aforementioned contribution each period. Therefore, the per-period budget constraint is given by:
where Y t is the yearly income, u is the number of periods under unemployment (including the current period) and κ represents the percentage of the individual's previously observed income (Y t−u ) that finances his or her unemployment insurance benefits. Income varies across individuals and over time due to differences in human capital accumulation (schooling and experience), as in a standard Mincer (1958) earnings function:
where S is the person's years of formal schooling, ξ t is an error term and = {0, 1}. That is,
Note that we allow for both schooling and experience to have independent effects on earnings in the wage and self-employed sectors. In addition, total experience also enters the earnings function, thus experience in one sector can have effects on earnings in the others sector, as well.
There is uncertainty in earnings and we allow it to differ across sectors. Therefore, ξ t are serially uncorrelated normally distributed shocks with zero mean, finite σ 2 ξ variance and E(ξ 0 ξ 1 ) = 0. In addition, as one may expect, the realization of the error term in the wage-employment sector occurs at the beginning of each period while the error in the selfemployment sectors is realized at the end of each period. That is, a labor contract stipulates the wage rate for the intervening year, while a self-employed worker does not know his total yearly earnings but until the end of each year.
For computational tractability, we model labor participation (E t ) exogenously and assume that the individual can only leave the labor market due to job loss. The probability of employment at age t (π t ) follows a logistic stochastic process that is a function of the individual's age, education and past labor employment history. The latter are given by an index of employment density, both overall and for the wage-earning sector (ED and WD, respectively).
t , E t , ED, WD) be the vector of state variables.
Solution
The present discounted value of lifetime utility from an individual of age t choosing to work in the sector at age t is
where β is the annual discount factor (set equal to 0.95) and p τ is the decision outcome at age τ that equals one if the individual chooses self-employment and zero otherwise. In order to facilitate computational tractability, we set a maximum age T = 65 at which workers retire and start receiving income only from their retirement accounts and own personal wealth. Therefore, the value function at T includes a static decision problem that only affects the individual's contemporaneous utility. Therefore,
Given employment, the value function at age T is given by
where
2 + η 9 X t + η 10 (X t ) 2 } be the certain components of labor earnings in each sector at time t. In addition, since ξ 0 t is known at any age t and ξ 1 t is unknown at any age t but it is common knowledge that its value is normally distributed with zero mean and σ 2 1 variance, then equations (12) can be expressed as:
Therefore, given employment, the individual would choose to be self-employed at age
Consequently, given employment at age T , the decision rule has the binomial logit form:
where Ω − T is the state space observed by the researcher. The expected discounted value function at age T is:
and δ 1 captures the average amount of precautionary saving that individuals use in case of unemployment on top of any benefit received due to unemployment insurance (κY 0 T −u ). Given the assumption of normal distribution for ξ , implies
where Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution. Solving backwards brings in the value functions, decision rules and probabilities for each age t < T as a function of the relevant state space:
which implies the following decision rule and expected discounted value function as of the beginning of age t:
As in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) , we assume that the salaries in the wage-earning sector are reported with error. Though this assumption does not affect the decision rules (equations 15 and 20), it allows us to alleviate the impact of outlier observations in the likelihood function.
where Y r t is the reported income, Y t is the true income, ψ t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ψ ) and E(ξ t ψ t ) = 0. Then, Θ = {α 1 , δ 1 , δ 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , γ 4 , γ 5 , η 1 , η 2 , η 3 , η 4 , η 5 , η 6 , η 7 , η 8 , η 9 , η 10 , σ 
Likelihood Function and Estimation Procedure
The estimation method is maximum likelihood. This approach estimates the parameters of a statistical model by selecting the value of the parameter vector (Θ) that generates a probability distribution that maximizes the probability of obtaining the observed outcomes ("data"). In particular, the likelihood function is the joint density function for all observations, where the data are taken as fixed values while the model's parameters are the variables of the function. In this case, the likelihood function corresponding to each individual n is:
where for each individual n of age τ
and Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function, φ(·) is the normal probability density function, u τ,0 = ξ τ,0 + ψ τ,0 , λ = σ ξ,0 /σ ψ,0 and σ u,0 = σ
The likelihood for the complete sample is given by
That is, given the data, function L represents the likelihood of different vectors of parameter values of the model (the parameters behind each cutoff ξ * t ), which is equal to the joint probability of the observed outcomes (self-employment vs. salaries work) given those parameter values. That is, function L shows how likely a particular parameter vector is able to produce the observed outcome. For the case of this model, the maximum likelihood approach uses numerical optimization methods in order to find the parameter vector that maximizes the likelihood function (equation 25).
We follow a standard estimation algorithm. Given an initial set of parameter values, the computer calculates all predicted decisions (as given by the cutoffs, ξ * (Ω t )), and computes the likelihood function value using the actual decisions ( t 's). The optimization program finds a new set of parameters and the iterative process is repeated until the improvement in the likelihood function falls below a certain convergence criteria. The resulting set of parameters provides predicted responses that best match the actual responses.
The "initial condition problem," as described in Heckman (1981) , implies that the use of predetermined state variables as initial conditions normally generates inconsistent parameter estimates, as they contain information from previous choices. When the shocks are not serially correlated, however, these estimations problems need not occur. Consequently, as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Todd and Wolpin (2006) , we assume serial independence of the error term (ξ t ). This assumption allows us to use observed values of the state variables, including age (16 years old), sex, education, labor experience, employment status and employment type choice, in the likelihood function, without implying inconsistent estimates.
Identification
The model contains 20 parameters; the earnings function account for 13 of them, while the rest are related to the probability of employment (6 parameters), and the coefficient of risk aversion. Though the variables of a structural model are, by construction, identified, the solution of the model and the functional form of some of its equations may imply that some variables cannot be uniquely identified. In this model, however, the non-linear functional form of the utility function, the earnings function and the probability of employment, and data on experience, age, earnings, employment status and the type of employment, allow the direct identification of all parameters of the model. [TABLE 3 HERE]   Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model and their corresponding standard errors. Results can be summarized as follows. The first group of coefficients (γ's) corresponds to the parameters governing the worker's probability of employment at age t (π t ) as a function of the individual's age, education and past labor participation history. As expected, results suggest that schooling and age contribute significantly to improving the probability of employment. Though the coefficients on employment history are both positive, only the coefficient for the index of employment density in the wage-employment sector (WD) is statistically significant at a 5 percent confidence level.
Results
The following two parameters are related to the individual's risk preferences. First, as parameter α 1 < 0 suggests, individuals are on average risk averse (coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 1.338). That is, all else equal, including equal probability of unemployment (an assumption we maintain in the model for simplicity), individuals would tend to choose wage-earning jobs, as it allows them to reduce uncertainty for the same expected income. Second, δ 1 , which captures the average precautionary saving rate due to income loss caused by unemployment, results to be not statistically significant.
The next group of parameters (η's) are associated with the earnings function (equation 6). First, data suggest that, after controlling for education and experience, the residual average earnings gap between sectors (η 2 ) does not significantly affect the individual's utility. Second, higher levels of education increase the average wage levels of jobs in both sectors (η 3 > 0 and η 4 > 0). Consistent with Robinson and Sexton (1994) , however, education does not affect marginal earnings significantly differently between the wage-earning and self-employed sectors.
Third, the marginal utility of choosing each type is positively affected (at decreasing rates) by the number of years of experience that individuals present in each sector (i.e., η 5 > 0, η 6 < 0, η 7 > 0, η 8 < 0, η 9 > 0 and η 10 < 0). Note that this feature provides the dynamic nature of the model's choice making. Also note that, unlike education, experience as self-employed has a larger impact on earnings than experience as wage earner, consistent with the common notion that experience is crucial for self-employment success.
5 Since experience enters in a quadratic manner, comparison between sectors cannot be observed directly. Therefore, using the estimated covariance matrix, we compute a difference t-test in order to compare the return to experience as self-employed relative to as wage earner. Results show that for 5, 10, 15, and 20 years of experience, the return to self-employed experience is significantly larger than that for wage earners.
6 Finally, though the volatility of earnings is higher for selfemployment than for the wage-earning sector (σ 2 ξ,0 > σ 2 ξ,1 ), their difference is not statistically significant.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
5 Iversen, Malchow-Møller and Sørensen (2010) , who use data for Denmark, also find that the impact on earnings of self-employment experience is significantly higher than that of wage employment. Robinson and Sexton (1994) find similar results for the U.S.
6 The value of the corresponding t-test for the null hypothesis H 0 : (η 5 + 2η 6 · experience) − (η 7 + 2η 8 · experience) = 0 for experience = 5, 10, 15, 20 are -4.95, -4.92, -4.58, and -3.01, respectively. We assess the overall quality of our model's estimated parameters by observing its ability to correctly predict actual choices. Table 4 presents the results for goodness of fit tests by comparing the actual percentages of respondents that chose wage-earning jobs with those predicted by the model. The analysis is conducted for the overall sample, as well as by categories of years of schooling, experience and age. A 95-percent confidence chi-square test of goodness of fit for overall participation suggests the model does a very good job at estimating the actual decisions made by workers, as the predicted value does not differ statistically from the actual one.
As previously observed in the raw data, table 4 panel a shows that the percentage choosing wage-earning jobs increases as the average level of education of respondents rises. As previously indicated, this finding departs from results found for developed economies.
7 For developing countries, however, the unconstrained relationship between education and selfemployment is reversed due to the importance of low-skilled occupations in this sector. Puentes et al. (2007) highlight that self-employment in the developing world is usually linked to "poor job conditions, vulnerability and instability." The authors find that education is associated with drops in self-employment as the return to education tends to be higher for wage-earning jobs, making this sector more attractive than self-employment.
Panels b-c break down the educational categories with respect to different levels of experience. Panel b considers individuals choosing wage-earning jobs by overall experience. While experience in each sector is relevant for the choice of the type of work, both the data and the model tend to show that greater overall labor experience tends to be associated with fewer workers choosing wage-earning jobs as the number years of experience accumulate. Intuitively, enough years of experience, even in the wage-employment sector, may provide the skills and knowledge necessary for some to decide to embark upon self-employment endeavors. Though there are some minor discrepancies in terms of this trend between actual and predicted values, the differences between them are not statistically significant. Panel c breaks down actual and predicted choices by education and experience in the wage-earning sector only. Unlike in panel b, more years of experience as wage earner are, as expected, linked to higher participation in this sector due to its direct impact in earnings. This pattern is also maintained for the different categories of education.
Finally, panel d presents the actual and predicted participation in wage-earning jobs by age. Results are similar to those from panel b, as one may expect that age and total labor experience are highly correlated. That is, individuals tend to prefer wage-earning jobs over self-employment as they age. This result is consistent with previous studies. Borjas and Bronars (1989) find that self-employed workers are older than wage earners by about 3 to 5 years. Puentes et al. (2007) also find age as the most significant predictor of self-employment, though these authors use age as a proxy for experience.
7 Rees and Shah (1986) show that years of schooling positively affect the chance of an individual to choose a self-employed job. The authors believe that more education can be linked to lower dispersion in selfemployed earnings, in particular if self-employed jobs are hard to find and assess and higher educated people are inherently better informed. Borjas and Bronars (1989) show that self-employed workers are significantly more likely to have a college degree than wage earners. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) , on the other hand, find no statistically significant correlation between education and entrepreneurship under liquidity constraints.
6 Do Self-Employed Workers Value More Certainty?
A Policy Simulation Exercise
Currently, unemployment insurance in Chile, like health insurance and saving for retirement, is a social protection instrument that is mandatory for wage earners only. A mixture of myopic behavior and lack of information may be behind the resulting low participation of self-employed workers in the social security system (about 4 percent in 2006, Bravo et al. 2010) , a trend that has long been a concern for government authorities. As a response, the Chilean government implemented a major reform to the social security system in 2008. The main objective of such a reform was to expand the coverage of social protection policies within the Chilean society by incorporating more groups into the system. The new legislation contemplates expanding all rights and obligations that wage earners currently have to self-employed individuals, as well. That is, self-employed workers would be eligible to access the same social security, health insurance and unemployment insurance benefits as wage earners currently have. At the same time, they would be mandated to contribute the same fraction of their monthly income as wage earners do.
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Given that our results suggest that the accumulation of sector-specific experience is highly relevant in workers choices, it follows that they would more likely specialize as either selfemployed or wage earner. Therefore, it may be worth exploring how strongly self-employed workers value a reduction in their income uncertainty. Put differently, would the resulting increase in well-being compensate for the cost of purchasing the mandatory insurance?
The first question we try to tackle in this simulation exercise is whether or not the policy change would be beneficial to individuals. We expect that if workers do place significant value to the new scheme, their chances to become self-employed would increase. Therefore, an overall measure of the impact on well-being of the policy change could be related to the potential increase in the number of individuals choosing self-employment. In addition, since we have found that our model presents a dynamic feature that is captured by the relevant role played by the accumulation of specific experience, we expect that the reform would be more beneficial for workers with less overall and specific experience. That is, the policy change would give greater incentives for younger and less experienced workers to choose self-employment. [TABLE 5 HERE] Having estimated the structural parameters of the model, we can conduct simulations in order to perform an ex-ante program evaluation of how the aforementioned legislative modification may affect labor decisions by individuals. We model the hypothetical situation by making both options identical with respect to the structure of an individual's budget constraint (equation 5), 9 though maintaining the differences in preferences over them and in terms of the level and dispersion of earnings. Table 5 describes the impact on the predicted percentage of individuals in our sample that would choose to become self-employed workers. Overall, requiring all workers to buy unemployment insurance would increase the fraction of self-employed workers in our sample by almost 3 percent, from 17.7 percent before the policy change to 20.5 percent after its implementation. This observed increase in workers choosing self-employment as a consequence of the policy change leads us to conclude that the reform would probably be significantly valued by affected individuals, that it would generate increases in aggregate well-being and possibly gains in labor productivity.
The direction of the flow of workers is observed for all categories of education, experience and age, with the exception of the group with the lowest number of years of schooling. We also observe a stronger impact of the reform on choices for younger workers. Namely, while older individuals increase their participation in self-employment from 23.2 percent to 24.5 percent, younger workers increase it from 11.4 percent to 18.4 percent. Likewise, the trend towards self-employment diminishes as the number of years of both total and sector-specific experience increases. These results are consistent with what we had anticipated for the dynamic impact of experience and specialization on workers' decisions.
Concluding Remarks
This paper models an individual's choice of whether to be a wage earner or a self-employed worker. We incorporate the role of both preferences and earnings characteristics in affecting this type of decision. The dynamic feature of this model arises from the fact that a choice would affect the accumulation of experience in one sector but not the other. Though vast economic literature stresses the impact of experience on the future path of income, few, if any, analyze experience and self-employment decisions in a dynamic framework.
We propose a model that captures the dynamic nature of the choice of employment type and we solve the dynamic programming optimization problem recursively. The structural parameters are estimated using panel data from Chile's Social Security Survey (Encuesta de Protección Social) for 2002, 2004 and 2006 . Uncertainty in this model arises from the unknown stream of income from either sector and the probability of becoming unemployed in each period. Only wage earners are required by law to purchase unemployment insurance.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model show that (1) workers are on average risk averse; (2) after controlling for education and experience, the residual earnings gap does not significantly affect choices; (3) education affects average earnings though its marginal effect does not significantly vary between sectors; (4) experience significantly affects earnings in each sector, and (5) experience as self-employed has a larger impact on earnings than that for wage earners.
Policy simulation for a proposed mandatory unemployment insurance shows that, though there is a trade-off between cost and benefits for self-employed individuals, the fraction of workers in this sector would increase by about 3 percent. We replicate the proposed unemployment insurance scheme by requiring self-employed workers to purchase unemployment insurance and having them receive supplemental income in periods of unemployment. The net flow of workers towards self-employment is present for all categories of education, labor experience and age, though it is stronger for younger and less experienced individuals. These results are consistent with the extensive literature that relates productivity, compensation and labor mobility. Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * means significant at 95 percent confidence.
"wage" means wage employment; "self" means self-employment. 
